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Abstract
In this paper, I want to substantiate three related claims regarding causal discovery from non-experimental data. Firstly, in
scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and far-reaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears
upon the following situation. A set of random variables V is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for
some variables A and B it is not known whether they are (conditionally) independent. Secondly, Judea Pearl’s most meritorious and
influential algorithm for causal discovery (the IC algorithm) cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. It presupposes that a full list
of (conditional) independence relations is on hand and it would lead to unsatisfactory results when applied to partial lists. Finally,
the problem of ignorance is successfully treated by means of ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery presented in this paper.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction: causal discovery and the problem of ignorance
Since the end of the 1980s, the interrelations between probability theory, graph theory and causal discovery have
been studied by increasing numbers of research groups. Different algorithms have been developed to infer causal
relations from non-experimental statistical data.2
In this paper, I will discuss Judea Pearl’s IC algorithm [18, pp. 50–51]. It is one of the best known algorithms for
causal discovery, or ‘inductive causation’, and its merits can hardly be overrated. Nevertheless, it faces a hard and very
important problem. In this section, I want to substantiate three related claims. Firstly, in scientific practice, the problem
of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and far-reaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears upon the following
situation. A finite set of random variables V is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for
some variables A,B and for some sets of variables Q it is not known whether A and B are independent (conditional
on Q). So ‘ignorance’ should not be understood as ‘probabilistic knowledge’, or ‘degree of belief <1’, but as the
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2 See Spirtes et al. [19, Chapters 5–6] and Neapolitan [15] for an overview of several different such algorithms.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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presupposes that a full list of (conditional) independence relations is on hand.4 If it would be applied to partial lists,
this would moreover lead to unsatisfactory results. Thirdly, the problem of ignorance can be solved without losing the
strong points of the IC algorithm, viz. by means of an adaptive logic for causal discovery.5
Let me shortly dwell on the first claim. In scientific practice, for example in the social sciences or in epidemiology,
the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous. This may be illustrated by an example. The influence of many different factors
on cognitive skills and educational achievement are studied by many different research groups. Some research groups
focus on cultural factors, some on sociological factors, still others on psychological ones. Other research groups focus
on biological, chemical or other factors. In total, hundreds of variables are studied.6 The combined research of all
these groups gives rise to the confirmation and disconfirmation of many CIRs and UIRs, as in each study several
possible confounders are tested for.7 However, not all possible (conditional) independencies are tested.
The problem of ignorance is moreover persistent. Even if many conditional independence relations can be ruled
out a priori, on the basis of reliable background knowledge, micro-level knowledge, common sense arguments, . . . ,
many others will still be undecided.
Finally, the problem of ignorance is far-reaching. If the causal interpretation of non-experimental data requires that
all (conditional) independencies are decided, as in the IC algorithm, then observational science would lose large part
of its materiality. No causal knowledge could ever be obtained in the short run.8
In Section 5, I will present ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery which properly solves the problem of
ignorance while doing justice to the merits of Pearl’s IC. First, however, I will present the formal background to
IC (Section 2), and also the algorithm itself (Section 3). Then I will present LIC, a non-adaptive logic for causal
discovery (Section 4). By itself, LIC has little to add to the IC algorithm, but its significance derives from the role it
plays in the formulation of ALIC.
2. Formal background to causal discovery
In this section I will shortly present the formal background to IC. Section 2.1 deals with directed acyclic graphs
and their relations with probability distributions. Section 2.2 is on faithful indistinguishability classes and patterns.
Finally, Section 2.3 treats of the graphoid axioms and their meta-theoretic properties (the relevance of which will
prove in Sections 4.4 and 5.5).
2.1. Directed acyclic graphs and probability distributions
In this paper, causal structures will be described by means of directed acyclic graphs, or DAGs. A graph G = 〈V,E〉
consists of a finite set of vertices V and a finite set of edges E. In a directed graph, all edges are directed (→). Two
vertices A and B are adjacent (A − B) iff either A → B ∈ E, or B → A ∈ E. There is a path between A and B iff
there is a sequence of adjacent vertices, beginning with A and ending with B . A directed path (A ⇒ B) is a path that
has no colliders (X → Y ← Z) or forks (X ← Y → Z). A path that contains no vertex more than once is acyclic.
A directed, acyclic graph (DAG) is a graph that contains no directed, cyclic paths.
3 In 2006, Rolf Haenni and Stephan Hartmann devoted a special issue of Minds and Machines to the topic of Causality, Uncertainty and Ignorance.
Unfortunately, none of the papers in question treated ‘ignorance’ in the sense just stated, viz. the presence of undecided independencies [8].
4 In the rest of this paper, I will use the following abbreviations. ‘UIR’ will stand for ‘unconditional independence relation’. Likewise, ‘CIR’ will
stand for ‘conditional independence relation’. ‘IR’ will be used as an umbrella term. Note that the relations in question are particular relations; they
are relations between particular (sets of) variables.
5 Since the adaptive logic to be presented is based on IC, it involves only finite sets of finite variables. Like IC, it also assumes causal sufficiency
(i.e. if two variables under study share a common cause, this cause is observed, too).
6 The ISI Web of Knowledge cites hundreds of articles on “educational achievement”, published between 2000 and 2007. Many of them report
non-experimental data (e.g. the National Education Longitudinal Study). The scope of the factors studied is huge: it ranges from television viewing,
social capital and self-esteem over parasites, maternal smoking, birth order, ethnicity, . . .
7 I use ‘confirmation’ and ‘disconfirmation’ in a loose sense, here.
8 The problem of ignorance not only lurks in scientific practice, but also in everyday human reasoning. Humans often endorse or disaffirm CIRs
and UIRs between many different variables, thereby leaving undecided a large number of IRs.
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variables with a finite number of discrete values. In this paper, random variables are represented by italicized capital
letters: e.g. A,B,C, . . . or X,Y,Z, . . . Values of variables are represented by italicized small letters: e.g. a, b, c, . . .
or x, y, z, . . . Sets of variables are denoted by bold capital letters: e.g. A,B,C, . . . or X,Y,Z, . . . Configurations of
values for all members of a set of variables are denoted by bold small letters: e.g. a,b, c, . . . or x,y, z, . . .
Let P(V) be a joint distribution over V. P may verify some independence relations (IRs).
Definition 1 ((Un)conditional independence). According to P , A,B ⊆ V are independent conditional on Q ⊆ V, in
short (A 	P B | Q), iff P(a | b,q) = P(a | q) for all a,b and q (whenever P(b,q) > 0). Likewise, A and B are
unconditionally independent, in short (A 	P B), iff P(a | b) = P(a) (whenever P(b) > 0)9 [18, p. 11].
A DAG G = 〈V,E〉 can be used to represent the IRs verified by P(V). To that extent, P and G need to satisfy two
conditions: the Markov condition and the Faithfulness condition. These conditions are formulated in terms of kinship
relations between variables. B is a parent of A iff B → A ∈ E. Parents(A) is the set of parents of A. Other kinship
relations are defined likewise. By convention, A is its own child and descendant, even though A → A and A ⇒ A are
ruled out in DAGs.
Convention 1. A ∈ Children(A), and hence also A ∈ Descendants(A).
Definition 2 (Markov). (See [18, p. 30].) G = 〈V,E〉 and P(V) satisfy the Markov condition iff for every A ∈ V,
(A	 Nondescendants(A) \ Parents(A) | Parents(A))
Given any graph G, the Markov condition generates a set of IRs. But probability distributions that are Markov to
G may verify extra IRs, too. The faithfulness condition rules out such distributions.
Definition 3 (Faithfulness). Let P(V) be a probability distribution generated by G = 〈V,E〉 according to the Markov
condition. G and P satisfy the faithfulness condition iff every IR true in P is entailed by the Markov condition applied
to G [19, p. 13].
As I stated earlier, a DAG G = 〈V,E〉 may be used to represent the IRs verified by some P(V). If P is Markov
and faithful to G, then all and only those IRs that are entailed by the Markov condition applied to G are true in P . It
is difficult, however, to delineate the set of these relations. The graph-theoretical concept of d-separation provides an
easy means to do this [19, p. 44].
Definition 4 (d-separation). Let G = 〈V,E〉 be a DAG. If Q ⊂ V and A,B ∈ V \ Q, then A and B are d-separated
given Q in G, in short (A	G B | Q) iff there is no path U between A and B , such that
1. for every collider . . . → C ← . . . on U , Descendants(C)∩ Q = ∅,10
2. and no other vertex on U is in Q.
If X = ∅,Y = ∅ and Z are three disjoint sets, then X is d-separated from Y given W iff every member of X is
d-separated from every member of Y given Z.
2.2. Faithful indistinguishability classes and patterns
The relation between conditional independence and d-separation is characterized by the following two theorems,
the last of which lays at the basis of Judea Pearl’s IC algorithm for causal discovery.
9 Conditional probability is defined as follows: P(a | b) = P(a,b)/P (b).
10 Note again that C ∈ Descendants(C), by Convention 1.
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Q) iff (A 	G B | Q)
Proof. See Spirtes et al. [19, pp. 385–393]. 
Theorem 2. If P(V) is faithful to some DAG, then it is faithful to the DAG G = 〈V,E〉 iff
1. for all A,B ∈ V, A−B iff ∼ (A	P B | Q) for all ∅ ⊆ Q ⊆ V \ {A,B};
2. and for all A,B,C ∈ V such that A − B − C, but not A − C, A → B ← C is a subgraph of G iff ∼ (A 	P C |
Q ∪ {B}) for all ∅ ⊆ Q ⊆ V \ {A,B,C}.
Proof. See Spirtes et al. [19, pp. 393–394]. 
The IC algorithm takes as its input a probability distribution P that is Markov and faithful to some underlying
DAG G0.11 The intended output is the DAG G0. In most cases, however, several DAGs are statistically indistin-
guishable from G0—i.e. no non-experimental data can distinguish between G0 and these other DAGs. DAGs that are
statistically indistinguishable belong to the same indistinguishability class [19, pp. 59, 61]. There are several different
concepts of indistinguishability and corresponding indistinguishability classes. In the rest of this section, I will dis-
cuss faithful indistinguishability. Two graphs G = 〈V,E〉 and G′ = 〈V,E′〉 are faithfully indistinguishable (f.i.) iff for
every P(V), P(V) is Markov and faithful to G iff it is Markov and faithful to G′. Whether or not two DAGs are f.i.
can be easily verified by the following graphic criterion:
Definition 5 (Faithful indistinguishability). Two DAGs G and G′ are faithfully indistinguishable iff (i) they have the
same vertex set V, (ii) they have the same underlying undirected graph: A−B in G iff A−B in G′ and (iii) they have
the same unshielded colliders: if A−B −C and not A−C in G or in G′, then A → B ← C in G iff A → B ← C in
G′ [19, p. 61].
Faithful indistinguishability classes may be represented by a pattern Π = 〈V,E〉. A pattern is a partially directed
graph: E may contain both directed (. . . → . . .) and undirected edges (. . . − . . .) edges. Each pattern Π represents
a set of graphs Repr(Π). Whether G = 〈V,E〉 ∈ Repr(Π) may be determined by the following graphic criterion.
G = 〈V,E〉 ∈ Repr(Π) iff
1. G and Π have the same adjacency relations;
2. if A → B in Π , then A → B in G;
3. if A → B ← C and not A−C in G, then A → B ← C and not A−C in Π .
2.3. The graphoid axioms, incompleteness and partial completeness
In this section, I will shortly dwell on some meta-theoretical results regarding the (semi-)graphoid axioms, since
these are relevant for the rest of this paper.12
A ternary relation 	 between disjoint subsets of V is a semi-graphoid over V iff it satisfies the following axiom
schemata13 (cf. [20, p. 176], see also [7]):
(G1) (A 	 B | Q) ⊃ (B 	 A | Q) (Symmetry).
(G2) (A 	 ∅ | Q) (Trivial Independence).
(G3) (A 	 B ∪ C | Q) ⊃ (A 	 B | Q) (Decomposition).
(G4) (A 	 B ∪ C | Q) ⊃ (A 	 B | Q ∪ C) (Weak Union).
11 The requirement that P is Markov and faithful to some DAG G0 will prove to be very important in Section 3.2.
12 In fact, the (semi-)graphoid axioms are not axioms, but axiom schemata. But for reasons of readability, I will use ‘axiom’ and ‘axiom schema’
interchangeably.
13
‘⊃’ denotes material implication; ‘∧’ denotes classical conjunction.
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It is a graphoid over V iff it also satisfies the following extra schema:
(G6) ((A 	 B | Q ∪ C)∧ (A 	 C | Q ∪ B)) ⊃ (A 	 B ∪ C | Q) (Intersection).
The graphoid axioms are highly relevant for the following three reasons. Firstly, probabilistic conditional indepen-
dence is a (semi-)graphoid (Theorem 3). This means that the graphoid axioms may be used to derive IRs from other
IRs. Secondly, however, probabilistic conditional independence is not in general completely axiomatizable (Theo-
rem 4). But this does not alter the fact that, thirdly, some interesting subclasses of (semi-)graphoids are completely
axiomatizable (Theorem 5).
Theorem 3. For any probability measure P , 	P is a semi-graphoid. Moreover, if P is strictly positive (i.e., if P(A) = 0
only for A = ∅), then 	P is a graphoid [20, p. 176].
So the axioms (G1)–(G5) are sound for probabilistic conditional independence and (G6) is sound in case P is
strictly positive. By contrast, (G1)–(G6) are not in general complete for probabilistic conditional independence. This
follows from the following theorem of Milan Studený:
Theorem 4. There is no finite set of independent axioms which is complete for probabilistic conditional independence.
More specifically, there is no finite set of rules of the form (r  0):
((A1 	 B1 | C1)∧ · · · ∧ (Ar 	 Br | Cr )) ⊃ (Ar+1 	 Br+1 | Cr+1)
such that for any set T of IRs on any set of variables V there is a probability measure P(V) such that 	P = 	, i.e.
such that
(A 	P B | Q) iff (A 	 B | Q) ∈ Cl(T )
(where Cl(T ) is the closure of T under the given set of rules) [21].
As I stated above, there are some interesting subclasses of (semi-)graphoids that may be completely characterized.
For example:
Theorem 5. For each semi-graphoid 	 generated by a list of total causes there is a probability measure P such that
	P = 	 [20, p. 180].
A list of total causes is a set of IRs for which there is a linear ordering X1,X2, . . . of all variables in V such that the
list contains for each Xk exactly one statement of the form (Xk	{X1, . . . ,Xk−1}\J | J) for some J ⊆ {X1, . . . ,Xk−1}.
A (semi-)graphoid is generated by a list of total causes iff it is the closure of that list under the (semi-)graphoid axioms
[20, p. 179].
Let P ∗(V) be Markov to the DAG G0 = 〈V,E〉, i.e. P ∗(V) is a distribution that verifies, for all A ∈ V, the IR
(A	 Nondescendants(A) \ Parents(A) | Parents(A)) that results from applying the Markov condition to G0. The set
of all these IRs is a list of total causes. Hence, the (semi-)graphoid 	 generated by this list is completely axiomatized
by the (semi-)graphoid axioms and for all P that are Markov and faithful to G0: 	P = 	.
3. The IC algorithm for causal discovery
In Section 3.1, I will present the IC algorithm. Then I will show to what extent it is impotent regarding the problem
of ignorance (Section 3.2) and give a hint at the solution which I will present in the rest of this paper (Section 3.3).
3.1. The algorithm
The IC algorithm is based on the relations between DAGs, probability distributions and f.i. classes described in
Sections 2.1 and 2.2. It runs as follows [18, pp. 50–51]:
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line so as to obtain the right-hand side.
Input A probability distribution P ∗(V) which is faithful to some underlying DAG D0 (or the list of IRs that it
verifies).
Output A pattern Π∗ representing all DAGs that form a complete causal explanation for the IRs verified by P ∗(V);
i.e. all DAGs G such that (A 	P ∗ B | Q) iff (A 	G B | Q). These DAGs form the f.i. class of D0.
Algorithm The algorithm consists of three consecutive steps:
1. For all A,B ∈ V search for a (possibly empty) set Q ⊆ V \ {A,B} such that (A	P ∗ B | Q). Construct an
undirected graph G1 such that A−B iff no such Q can be found.
2. For all A,B,C ∈ V such that A−C −B and not A−B in G1, check if C ∈ Q. If it is, then continue. If
it is not, then A → C ← B . The resulting graph is G2.
3. Starting from G2, orient as many of the undirected edges as possible subject to two conditions: (i) the
orientation should not create a new v-structure; and (ii) the orientation should not create a directed cycle.
This is done by closing G2 under the rules R3.1–R3.4 depicted in Fig. 1.14
3.2. Taking stock of IC
The IC algorithm certainly is meritorious as it provides an interesting means to infer causal relations from non-
experimental data. However, it is impotent regarding the problem of ignorance. Firstly, its possible inputs are restricted
to full lists of IRs. Secondly, when applied to partial lists of IRs, IC would lead to unsatisfactory results.
The possible inputs of IC are restricted to full lists of IRs. This follows from the requirement that P ∗(V) is Markov
and faithful to D0. The graphoid 	 generated by applying the Markov condition to D0 is completely axiomatized by
(G1)–(G6). Hence for all A,B ∈ V and all Q ⊆ V \ {A,B} it is known whether or not (A 	P ∗ B | Q); all IRs are
decided.
Now suppose that IC were applied to a partial list of IRs. A straightforward solution would be to take a negation
as failure account: all CIRs (A 	 B | Q) and IRs (A 	 B) not occurring in the input (failure) should be taken to be
false (negation). This approach, however, has a serious drawback: it treats conditional and unconditional sentences on
a par. From a pragmatic point of view, I will argue, this is unsatisfactory. Whereas the negation as failure account is
sensible with respect to the former, it certainly isn’t with respect to the latter.
The negation as failure account is sensible regarding conditional independence (CIRs). Suppose that A and B are
known to be unconditionally dependent, ∼ (A 	 B), that all tested sentences (A 	 B | Q) were falsified, but that
(A	B | Q∗) is still undecided for some Q∗. Even if correlation is no proof for direct causation, it is often regarded as
a useful indicator—and so it should be, otherwise non-experimental causal research would be a rather idle enterprise
(cf. the importance attached to epidemiological evidence by the IARC [10]). This requirement may satisfactorily be
met by considering all undecided (A 	 B | Q∗) as false (negation as failure), provided faulty applications of this
heuristic can be detected and remedied quickly.
By contrast, the negation as failure account is unsatisfactory for unconditional independencies (UIRs). Large part
of scientific practice consists in finding models that are simple enough to be manageable and useful for prediction,
explanation and/or intervention. Models are simulacra that share some, but not all the characteristics of the phenomena
14 The rules R3.1–R3.4 are necessary [23] and sufficient [12] for obtaining the pattern Π∗ representing the intended equivalence class.
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world. Abstraction and idealization are non-negligible aspects of scientific modelling. Moreover, they are already
implicitly present in Pearl’s framework. The Markov and the Faithfulness condition together imply the Minimality
condition [19, p. 31].15 If G = 〈V,E〉 and P(V) satisfy the Minimality condition, then each edge in G prevents some
conditional independence that would otherwise obtain; apart from that, G does not contain any superfluous edges
[19, p. 12]. However, if all undecided (A 	 B)-sentences are taken to be false (negation as failure), the resulting
model would be gratuitously complex. In scientific practice, if (A 	 B) is undecided, then it is frequently or even
mostly the case that for all Q∗, (A	B | Q∗) is undecided too. Hence, in view of the previous paragraph, negation as
failure would allow to infer that A−B . Therefore negation as failure should not be applied to undecided UIRs. These
should be considered as true, provided faulty applications of this heuristic can be detected and remedied quickly.
Before I give a short introduction to adaptive logics in Section 3.3, I will first pursue some possible epistemological
worries. My suggestions may come across as too rash to some readers. Why should we rely on default assumptions
which will most probably be violated in many contexts? And what would be the consequences of any such violation?
The following three remarks should help to remove such doubts. Firstly, in scientific practice defeasible assumptions
are abundantly used for causal inference. In his short but highly influential paper, Sir Austin Bradford Hill [9, p. 295]
addresses the question how to pass from an observed association to a verdict of causation in occupational medicine,
when no general body of medical knowledge provides a decisive answer. After listing nine viewpoints from which
to investigate the association in question, he argues that no decisive criterion (or set of criteria) exists. Hence, the
inference from association to causation is defeasible. Nevertheless, we are pragmatically forced to judge (whether the
association is causal or not, whether the assumed cause is suitable for intervention or not), given that we have to take
action:16
All scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be
upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we
already have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time [9, p. 300].
Secondly, the use of default assumptions is not new in the literature on causal inference. For example,
Williamson [24, Chapters 5, 6] proposes to use the Maximum Entropy principle (MaxEnt) to handle the problem
of ignorance. Suppose we are given a partial list of IRs. Then many different probability functions will satisfy this
list. If the set of these functions is closed and convex, MaxEnt selects the single member which is maximally non-
committal with regard to missing information. (The MaxEnt principle generalizes the Principle of Indifference; see
also [16,17].) As the selected probability function will mostly be at odds with any new information, the suggested
mechanism is defeasible and non-monotonic (cf. infra, Section 5.6). Thirdly, the adaptive logic framework provides
us with a dynamic proof theory which allows us (i) to trace the particular assumptions on which each inference is
based, and (ii) to trace the consequences of the violation of each particular assumption (i.e. faulty applications of each
heuristic can be detected and remedied quickly). As such, the dynamic proof theory allows us to cautiously apply
these default assumptions. This will become clear in Section 5.4, where I will present the proof theory of ALIC and
discuss its epistemological implications.
3.3. Towards an adaptive logic solving the problem of ignorance
In the following sections, I will show how the problem of ignorance may be solved. I will develop an adaptive logic
for causal discovery that properly gives shape to the findings of the previous section.
Using an adaptive logic (instead of, for example, some other default logic) has several advantages. Firstly, the
standard format of adaptive logics provides a unified framework for handling various non-monotonic consequence
relations (defaults, inconsistency-handling mechanisms, . . . ).17 Many defeasible consequence relations have success-
15 G = 〈V,E〉 and P(V) satisfy the Minimality condition if and only if for every G′ = 〈V,E′〉 such that E′ ⊂ E (i.e. for every subgraph G′ of G),
G′ = 〈V,E′〉 and P(V) do not satisfy the Markov Condition [19, p. 12].
16 I do not claim that Hill argued in favour of the defaults incorporated in the adaptive logic ALIC, only that he argued in favor of defeasible
reasoning.
17 Given this flexibility, it would be fairly easy to devise alternatives to ALIC, based on different rationales, to address the problem of ignorance.
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such unifying power. This unified framework makes it possible to easily compare such consequence relations. More-
over, contrary to most other non-monotonic logics (cf. [11]), adaptive logics provide a good proof theory that captures
the dynamics involved in non-monotonic reasoning. Finally, as I will argue in Section 5.4, ALIC’s dynamic proof
theory gives rise to a pragmatic picture of causal inference in which proofs may act as a guide for both scientific
research and policy.
Adaptive logics are non-monotonic logics [2–4]. In general, they are characterized by a triple AL = 〈LLL,Ω,
adaptive strategy〉. LLL is the lower limit logic of AL. It is the stable part of AL. Semantically, the adaptive models
of Γ are a subset of its LLL-models (Γ being a premise set). Proof theoretically, all the axioms and inference
rules of LLL may be applied unconditionally. Hence, if Γ LLL α, then Γ AL α. By contrast, the other axioms
or inference rules of AL are conditional: they may be applied on the condition that certain other formulas (certain
abnormalities) are not derivable. Ω is the set of abnormalities. These are formulas that are characterized by a (possibly
restricted) logical form and that are presupposed to be false, unless and until proven otherwise. Intuitively speaking,
an abnormality ω ∈ Ω is presupposed to be false relative to Γ , unless and until it turns out that Γ forces you to give
up this presupposition.19
Together, LLL and Ω define an upper limit logic ULL. Proof theoretically, the ULL is obtained by adding to
LLL an axiom or inference rule that connects abnormality to triviality. Semantically, the ULL-models are obtained
by selecting those LLL-models that verify no abnormality. The following theorem reveals a crucial relation between
LLL, Ω and ULL. (Dab(Δ) denotes a disjunction of the members of Δ.)
Theorem 6 (Derivability Adjustment Theorem). Γ ULL α iff there is a finite Δ ⊆ Ω such that Γ LLL α ∨ Dab(Δ).
Proof. See Batens [4, pp. 230–231]. 
In general, the following proof theoretic relations hold between AL, LLL, and ULL: If Γ is normal (i.e. if no
Dab-formulas are LLL-derivable from Γ ), then
CnLLL(Γ ) ⊂ CnAL(Γ ) = CnULL(Γ )
If Γ is abnormal, then
CnLLL(Γ ) ⊂ CnAL(Γ ) ⊂ CnULL(Γ ) = the set of all formulas
One of the best known adaptive strategies is reliability. It determines how to treat minimal Dab-consequences.
Dab(Δ) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ LLL Dab(Δ) and there is no Δ∗ ⊂ Δ such that Γ LLL Dab(Δ∗).
According to reliability, a formula is unreliable relative to Γ if it is a disjunct of a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ .20
4. LIC: the lower limit logic of ALIC
In this section I will present LIC, a non-adaptive logic for causal discovery. By itself, LIC does not add much to
IC, but its significance derives from the role it plays in the formulation of ALIC. I will describe both its language
(Section 4.1), its semantics (Section 4.2) and its proof theory (Section 4.3). I will conclude this section by briefly
discussing soundness and (in)completeness for LIC (Section 4.4).
18 Other results can be found at http://logica.UGent.be/centrum/writings/.
19 As I will show in Section 5.4, the proof theory of adaptive logics is such that it makes sense to write “unless and until it turns out that Γ forces
you to give up this presupposition”.
20 Another well-known strategy is minimal abnormality. The choice of strategy affects both the proof theory and the semantics of the adaptive
logic. In this paper, I will stick to reliability.
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Let V be a finite set of finite random variables. I will assume that all variables in V are different (different name
= different variable) and that they are logically independent.21 Let Wf be the set of factual propositions, i.e. the
smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
(L1) If X ∈ V and xi is a value of X, then X = xi ∈ S .
(L2) If α ∈ S , then α ∈ Wf .
(L3) If α,β ∈ Wf , then ∼ α, (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β) ∈ Wf .
The elements of V and of Wf by themselves do not belong to the language of LIC, but they serve as the basis
for the formulation of the latter. The atomic sentences of LIC are either probabilistic (Wp) or causal (Wc). Complex
sentences (W) are built from atomic ones by means of classical connectives. So Wp , Wc and W are the smallest sets
satisfying the following conditions:
(L4) If A,B,Q ⊂ V are disjoint sets of variables, then (A 	 B), (A 	 B | Q) ∈ Wp .
Convention 2. If A,B ∈ V and Q ⊆ V \ {A,B}, then I will write (A 	 B) and (A 	 B | Q) instead of ({A} 	 {B})
and ({A} 	 {B} | Q). Likewise, if Q is a singleton {Q}, I will write Q instead of {Q}.
(L5) If A and B ∈ V, then A → B,A−B , and A ⇒ B ∈ Wc.
(L6) If α ∈ Wp ∪ Wc, then α ∈ W .
(L7) If α ∈ W , then ∼ α ∈ W .
(L8) If α,β ∈ W , then (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β), (α ⊃ β), (α ≡ β), (α  β) ∈ W .22
4.2. The semantics of LIC
The semantics of LIC should meet certain obvious requisites. For one thing, each model should assign appropriate
truth values to the atomic probabilistic sentences, to the atomic causal sentences and to the classical complex sentences
(see (Sv1)–(Sv12)). Moreover, no model should allow for cyclicity (see (Sc.3)). Finally, the probabilistic sentences
verified by each model should be Markov and Faithful to the causal sentences it verifies (see (Sp9)).
To make sure that the semantics hereunder is recursive, I need to introduce an ordering relation ≺ over V. This
ordering may be done by lexicographic order, or by the Gödel numbers of the variables. Hence it is not the case that
A ≺ B iff A is an ancestor of B in some DAG.
• There is no A ∈ V such that A ≺ A.
• For all A,B ∈ V: either A ≺ B , or B ≺ A, but not both.
• For all A,B,C ∈ V: A ≺ B and B ≺ C implies A ≺ C.
An LIC-model is a triple M = 〈R+, c,p〉. R+ is the set of nonnegative real numbers (including 0). c is a function
which determines the causal relations holding between members of V. p is a probability distribution over V.
c is a partial function that maps couples of variables 〈A,B〉 to the set {l, r, n}, subject to the following conditions:
(Sc1) c : V × V → {l, r, n}.
(Sc2) c(〈A,B〉) is only defined for A ≺ B .
(Sc3) There is no {X1, . . . ,Xn} ⊆ V such that either c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = l for all 1 i  n− 1 and c(〈X1,Xn〉) = r , or
c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = r for all 1 i  n− 1 and c(〈X1,Xn〉) = l23 (acyclicity).
21 So V cannot contain both G, ‘gender’, and K , ‘being a king’, since by definition, all kings are male.
22 The last logical connective, , is the exclusive disjunction, cf. (Sv12). Although the exclusive disjunction can be easily omitted, I include it so
as to present the LIC-axioms in an intuitive way.
23 Note that I use the shorthand notation for the values of c throughout this section (cf. Convention 3).
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Convention 3. “c(〈A,B〉) = l” should be read as: “If A ≺ B , then c(〈A,B〉) = l. If B ≺ A, then c(〈B,A〉) = r .” In
the same manner, I will use “c(〈A,B〉) = n” as an abbreviation for “If A ≺ B , then c(〈A,B〉) = n. If B ≺ A, then
c(〈B,A〉) = n.” etc.
p is a function assigning a ‘weight’ to sentences in Wf . It is defined as the composition of two other functions, m
and o. m assigns a weight to the elements of a set S. o maps factual propositions to subsets of S.
(Sp1) Let S be a set with at least the cardinality of the sample space defined by V.
(Sp2) m :S→ R+.
(Sp3) ∑α∈Sm(α) = 1.
(Sp4) For all β ⊆S : m(β) =∑α∈β m(α).
(Sp5) For all β ⊆S : m(βc) = 1 − m(β).
(Sp6) For all β,γ ⊆S : m(β ∩ γ ) = m(β)+ m(γ )− m(β ∪ γ ).
(Sp7) o : S → ℘(S), where S is the set of atomic factual propositions X = xi .
o can be extended to a function mapping all factual propositions to subsets of S: o : Wf → ℘(S), with
• o(∼ α) = (o(α))c for all α ∈ Wf ,
• o(α ∧ β) = o(α)∩ o(β) for all α,β ∈ Wf , and
• o(α ∨ β) = o(α)∪ o(β), for all α,β ∈ Wf .
p is composed of m and o. Moreover, by condition (Sp9), p is Markov and faithful to c.
(Sp8) p(x) = m(o(x)).
(Sp9) If A,B /∈ Q, then (A	B | Q) iff every undirected path between A and B is d-separated by Q. More precisely,
p(A=a∧(B=b∧Q=q))
p(B=b∧Q=q) = p(A=a∧Q=q)p(Q=q) for all values a of A, b of B and q of Q (whenever p(B = b ∧ Q = q) > 0)
iff
0.1. c(〈A,B〉) = n, and
0.2. for any n-tuple 〈X1, . . . ,Xn〉 such that (i) n 3, (ii) X1 = A, (iii) Xn = B , and (iv) c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = n for
all 1 i  n− 1, at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) There is some 1 i  n− 2 such that c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = c(〈Xi+1,Xi+2〉) (= r or = l) and Xi+1 ∈ Q.
(b) There is some 1 i  n− 2 such that c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = l, and c(〈Xi+1,Xi+2〉) = r , and Xi+1 ∈ Q.
(c) There is some 1  i  n − 2 such that c(〈Xi,Xi+1〉) = r , and c(〈Xi+1,Xi+2〉) = l, and Xi+1 /∈ Q
and for all X such that there is an m-tuple 〈Y1, . . . , Ym〉 such that Y1 = Xi+1, and Ym = X, and for all
1 i m− 1, c(〈Yi, Yi+1〉) = r , X /∈ Q.
A valuation function vM determined by a model M = 〈R+, c,p〉 is a function that satisfies the following conditions:
(Sv1) vM : W → {0,1}.
(Sv2) vM((A 	 B)) = 1 iff p(A=a∧B=b)p(B=b) = p(A = a) for all values a of A and b of B (whenever p(B = b) > 0).
(Sv3) vM((A 	 B | Q)) = 1 iff p(A=a∧(B=b∧Q=q))p(B=b∧Q=q) = p(A=a∧Q=q)p(Q=q) for all values a of A, b of B and q of Q (whenever
p(B = b ∧ Q = q) > 0).
(Sv4) vM(A → B) = 1 iff c(〈A,B〉) = r .
(Sv5) vM(A−B) = 1 iff c(〈A,B〉) = n.
(Sv6) vM(A ⇒ B) = 1 iff there is a series of variables C1, . . . ,Cm ∈ V (m 2) such that A = C1, B = Cm, and for
all 1 i m− 1: c(〈Ci,Ci+1〉) = r .
(Sv7) vM(∼ α) = 1 iff vM(α) = 0.
(Sv8) vM(α ∧ β) = 1 iff vM(α) = vM(β) = 1.
(Sv9) vM(α ∨ β) = 1 iff vM(α) = 1 or vM(β) = 1.
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(Sv11) vM(α ≡ β) = 1 iff vM(α) = vM(β).
(Sv12) vM(α  β) = 1 iff vM(α) = vM(β).
Definition 6 (Truth in a model). α is true in a model M = 〈R+, c,p〉 (abbreviated as M | α) =df vM(α) = 1.
4.3. The proof theory of LIC
The proof theory of LIC should meet the following obvious requirements. Firstly, it should determine the behavior
of the classical connectives ∼,∧, . . . , of the 	-relation and of the causal relations →,− and ⇒. Secondly, it should
mimic the IC algorithm. These requirements are met by the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
(R1) α,α ⊃ β/β .
(A1) The axiom schemata of propositional classical logic.
(A2) The (semi-)graphoid axiom schemata.
(A3) ∼ (A ⇒ A).
(A4) A−B ≡ (A → B ∨B → A).
(A5) A ⇒ B ≡ (A → B ∨∨{(A ⇒ C ∧C → B) | C ∈ V \ {A,B}}).
(A6) A−B ∨{(A	B | Q) | Q ⊆ V \ {A,B}}.
(R2) A−C,C −B,∼ (A−B) / (A → C ∧B → C) ≡∨{(A	B | Q)∧ ∼ (A	B | Q ∪ {C}) | Q ⊂ V \ {A,B}}.
That the IC algorithm is adequately mimicked, can be easily ascertained. The steps in the algorithm are based on
a few basic premises. Firstly, no directed cyclic paths are allowed. This is mimicked by (A3) and (A5). Secondly,
two variables are adjacent if and only if no disjoint set screens them off. This is mimicked by (A6). Thirdly, three
variables A,B,C form a v-structure (i.e. A → C ← B and not A−B) if and only if there is a Q ⊂ V \ {A,B} such
that (A	B | Q) and not (A	B | Q ∪ {C}).
4.4. Soundness, but no completeness for LIC
The inference rules and axiom schemata listed in Section 4.3 are not complete with respect to the semantics of
Section 4.2. This follows from Theorem 4, given that I will not restrict the possible sets of premises to those sets
of IRs for which the graphoid axioms are complete. Consider a set T of IRs for which there is no P such that
(A	P B | Q) iff (A	B | Q) ∈ Cl(T ) (where Cl(T ) is the closure of T under the graphoid axioms). From Theorem 4
it follows that such a T exists. Hence each model M = 〈R+, c,p〉 of T verifies at least one IR /∈ Cl(T ). So all models
verify the disjunction of these additional IRs, but there is no guarantee that their disjunction is LIC-derivable from T .
Conversely, the rules and axioms in Section 4.3 are sound with respect to the semantics in Section 4.2.
Theorem 7 (Soundness for LIC). If Γ  α, then Γ | α.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
5. ALIC: the adaptive logic for causal discovery
Regarding the problem of ignorance, LIC, the non-adaptive logic presented in Section 4, is almost on a par with
the IC algorithm. In case the input or premise set Γ consists of a full list of IRs, neither LIC nor IC will run into
difficulty and they will produce the same causal output or consequence set: A−B ∈ CnLIC(Γ ) iff A−B ∈ Π(Γ ) or
A → B ∈ Π(Γ ) or B → A ∈ Π(Γ ) and A → B ∈ CnLIC(Γ ) iff A → B ∈ Π(Γ ). Likewise, neither LIC nor IC will
lead to satisfactory results in case the input or premise set Γ consists of a partial list of IRs.
As I said, LIC is almost on a par with IC. Since any set of LIC-wffs (i.e. any Γ ⊂ W) may serve as a premise set,
combining observational knowledge with background knowledge, micro-level knowledge, common sense knowledge,
etc. poses no technical problems. For example, if background knowledge shows that A causes B , or if common sense
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the premise set.24
In this section, I will present ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery which properly solves the problem
of ignorance. In Section 3.2, I have outlined the basic heuristics governing ALIC. In the face of an undecided CIR,
(A 	 B | Q), we should conceive of it as false, provided faulty applications of this heuristic can be detected and
remedied quickly. If not, non-experimental causal research would be a rather idle enterprise. In other words, CIRs
should be presupposed to be false, unless and until proven otherwise. This heuristic does not apply to UIRs. In the
face of an undecided UIR, (A 	 B), we should conceive of it as true, provided faulty applications of this heuristic
can be detected and remedied quickly. If not, our scientific models would be gratuitously complex. So UIRs should be
presupposed to be true, unless and until proven otherwise. These heuristics will be formalized singly in Sections 5.1
and 5.2, where I will present two auxiliary logics ALICRS and ALICAt. Then I will combine both auxiliary logics
(and their respective heuristics) in one single logic: ALIC. First I will describe its proof theory (Section 5.4). Then I
will describe its semantics and some straightforward meta-theoretic results (Section 5.5). Finally, I will briefly discuss
the relation between ALIC and MaxEnt-based causal discovery (Section 5.6).
5.1. ALICRS: the Reckless Statistician’s account of CIRs
The heuristic regarding conditional independence statements may metaphorically be called the heuristic of the
Reckless Statistician. If all CIRs (A 	 B | Q) are undecided, and if this heuristic is added to LIC, then one may
infer causation, A − B , from correlation, ∼ (A 	 B), contrary to one of the best-known warnings in introductory
statistics courses. Any statistician that would apply this heuristic blindly, would deservedly be called reckless. But as
I will show in the following sections, the adaptive logical framework affords a way to apply it properly. The Reckless
Statistician is tempered.25
The heuristic of the Reckless Statistician naturally leads to the following adaptive logic: ALICRS = 〈LIC,ΩRS,
reliability〉. The set of abnormalities ΩRS contains all CIRs regarding pairs of variables (not pairs of sets of variables).
ΩRS = {(A	B | Q) | A,B ∈ V,Q ⊆ V \ {A,B}}
By adding axiom schema (A7) to LIC, a suited upper limit logic ULLRS is obtained.26
(A7) ∼ (A	B | Q).
The ULLRS-semantics consists of the LIC-models for which c is such that
if c(〈A,B〉) = c(〈B,C〉) = r , then c(〈A,C〉) = r ,
if c(〈A,B〉) = c(〈B,C〉) = l, then c(〈A,C〉) = l,
if c(〈A,B〉) = l and c(〈B,C〉) = r , then c(〈A,C〉) = n.
I will not discuss the proof theory, nor the semantics of ALICRS as these are not significant for the present paper and
moreover are really straightforward (see [4, Sections 3 and 4]).
5.2. ALICAt: the Atomist’s account of UIRs
Where the first heuristic could be called the heuristic of the Reckless Statistician, the second one, regarding UIRs,
may metaphorically be called the heuristic of the Atomist. If all UIRs (A 	 B) are undecided, and if this heuristic is
24 In [12] a framework is presented which also allows to combine the IC-algorithm with background knowledge. However, this framework cannot
deal with the problem of ignorance. Moreover, it cannot deal with background knowledge consisting of complex formulas (in [12], background
knowledge consists of a pair K= 〈F,R〉 in which F is the set of directed edges which are forbidden and R is the set of directed edges which are
required).
25 The same intuition, viz. that ∼ (A	B) implies A−B , unless and until some set Q is found such that (A	B | Q), lays at the basis of the logic
presented in [22].
26 The reader can easily check that Theorem 6 holds for LIC, ΩRS and ULLRS.
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heuristic of the Atomist results in models that verify as little causal relations as possible.27
All this naturally leads to the following adaptive logic: ALICAt = 〈LIC,ΩAt, reliability〉, where ΩAt contains all
negations of UIRs regarding pairs of variables.
ΩAt = {∼ (A	B) | A,B ∈ V}
By adding axiom schema (A8) to LIC, a suited upper limit logic ULLAt is obtained.28 The ULLAt-semantics
consists of the LIC-models for which c(〈A,B〉) = n for all A,B ∈ V.
(A8) (A	B).
Again, I will not further discuss the proof theory or the semantics of ALICAt.
5.3. ALIC: outline
ALIC is the result of combining ALICRS and ALICAt. Its lower limit logic is LIC and its strategy is reliability.
Its set of abnormalities is the union of ΩRS and ΩAt:
ALIC = 〈LIC,ΩRS ∪ΩAt, reliability〉
As I will show in Section 5.4, the proof theory of ALIC is dynamic. Lines of a proof may be marked
(but also unmarked) as the proof continues. Formulas occurring on marked lines are not considered as derived.
Notwithstanding this dynamics, the set of ALIC-consequences of some premise set Γ is fixed: CnALIC(Γ ) =
CnALICRS(CnALICAt(Γ )).
29 This stability is reflected in the ALIC-semantics (see Section 5.5).
5.4. The proof theory of ALIC
ALIC-proofs are dynamic. Lines in a dynamic proof consist of five elements: (i) a line number k, (ii) a formula α,
(iii) the line numbers of the formulas from which α is derived, (iv) the rule by which α is derived, and (v) a condition
Υ .30 The condition is a (possibly empty) set of abnormalities. It determines whether α is derived or not. Intuitively,
if all members of Υ may be considered as false, then α is derived on line k. Otherwise, line k is marked and α is no
longer considered as derived.
The proof theory of ALIC consists of three generic deduction rules, and a marking definition. The deduction rules
allow one to add a line to the proof. By adding a line, the proof is brought to a next stage. The marking definitions
determine, at each stage s of the proof, which lines are marked and which are unmarked.
The generic deduction rules are as follows (Γ is a premise set):
PREM If α ∈ Γ , one may add a line comprising of the following elements: (i) an appropriate line number, (ii) α,
(iii) –, (iv) PREM, and (v) ∅.
RU If β1, . . . , βn LIC α and each of the βi occurs in the proof on lines i1, . . . , in that have conditions Υ1, . . . ,Υn
respectively, one may add a line comprising of the following elements: (i) an appropriate line number, (ii) α,
(iii) i1, . . . , in, (iv) RU, and (v) Υ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Υn.
RC If β1, . . . , βn LIC α ∨ Dab(Θ) (for some Θ ⊆ ΩRS ∪ ΩAt) and each of the βi occurs in the proof on lines
i1, . . . , in that have conditions Υ1, . . . ,Υn respectively, one may add a line comprising of the following ele-
ments: (i) an appropriate line number, (ii) α, (iii) i1, . . . , in, (iv) RC, and (v) Υ1 ∪ · · · ∪Υn ∪Θ .
27 An even better label would have been ‘the Greedy Statistician’, but ‘the Atomist’ was chosen to avoid entanglement with existing greedy search
strategies (cf. [24, p. 38]).
28 The reader can again easily check that Theorem 6 holds for LIC, ΩAt and ULLAt.
29 Although the proof theories of ALICRS and of ALICAt are also dynamic, CnALICRS (Γ ) and CnALICAt (Γ ) are fixed as well.
30 For a general characterization of the dynamic proof theory of adaptive logics, see [4, pp. 227–229]. For the proof theory of combined adaptive
logics, see [2, pp. 61–62].
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line k is not marked at stage s. Marking is governed by the marking definition, which is applied at each stage of the
proof. Let DabAt(Δ) denote a Dab-formula with Δ ⊆ ΩAt; and let DabRS(Δ) denote a Dab-formula with Δ ⊆ ΩRS.
Definition 7 (minimal DabAt-formula). Dab(Δ) is a minimal DabAt-formula at stage s of a proof iff
(1) Δ ⊆ ΩAt.
(2) At stage s, Dab(Δ) is the second element of a line i on the condition ∅.
(3) There is no Δ′ ⊂ Δ such that Dab(Δ′) satisfies condition (2).
Definition 8 (minimal DabRS-formula). Dab(Δ) is a minimal DabRS-formula at stage s of a proof iff
(1′) Δ ⊆ ΩRS.
(2′) At stage s, Dab(Δ) is the second element of a line i′ on the condition Θ ⊆ ΩAt.
(3′) Line i′ is unmarked at stage s.
(4′) There is no Δ′ ⊂ Δ such that Dab(Δ′) satisfies conditions (2′) and (3′).
Where Dab(Δ11), . . . ,Dab(Δ1n) are the minimal DabAt-formulas at stage s, UAts (Γ ) = Δ11 ∪ · · · ∪Δ1n is the set
of unreliable At-formulas at stage s. Likewise, where Dab(Δ21), . . . ,Dab(Δ2m) are the minimal DabRS-formulas at
stage s, URSs (Γ ) = Δ21 ∪ · · · ∪Δ2m is the set of unreliable RS-formulas at stage s.
Now everything is in place to present the marking definition, the application of which proceeds stepwise. At each
stage s of the proof, lines are first marked/unmarked in view of UAts (Γ ). Then lines are marked/unmarked in view of
URSs (Γ ).
Definition 9 (Marking for ALIC). Step 1: line i is marked at stage s iff, where Υ is its condition, Υ ∩UAts (Γ ) = ∅.
Step 2: after step 1, line i is marked at stage s iff, where Υ is its condition, Υ ∩URSs (Γ ) = ∅.31
Notwithstanding the dynamics of ALIC-proofs, the set of ALIC-consequences of some premise set Γ is fixed,
well-defined and proof-independent (see Definition 11).
Definition 10. α is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) α is the second element of line i, (ii) line
i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) any extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in
such a way that line i is unmarked.
Definition 11. Γ ALIC α (α is finally derivable from Γ ) iff α is finally derived on a line of a proof from Γ .
Let us briefly return to the worries raised in Section 3.2, viz. that the suggestions which eventually were incor-
porated in ALIC come across as too rash. I argued that default assumptions for causal inference are used both in
scientific practice (cf. [9]) and in the literature on causal modeling (cf. [24]). I also argued that the proof theory of
adaptive logics allows us (i) to trace the particular assumptions on which each inference or (intermediate) conclusion
is based (cf. the condition of each line in a proof), and (ii) to trace the consequences of the violation of each particular
assumption (cf. the marking definition). This gives rise to the following pragmatic picture of causal inference: given a
partial list of IRs, ALIC allows us to derive a set of consequences (giving rise to a DAG or a pattern representing our
causal beliefs). Some formulas are derived on the empty condition and hence are indubitable relative to the premises.
All other consequences may be accepted provisionally. Whether these may serve as a ground for action will depend
upon circumstances. Some interventions may be based on relatively slight evidence, while others need fair or even
very strong evidence (cf. [9, p. 300]). Hence, if α is derived on line i on the non-empty condition Υi , we may either
31 The marking definition depends on the adaptive strategy, in casu quo reliability. Minimal abnormality would result in a different definition (see
[2, Section 6]).
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As such, ALICs dynamic proofs may act as a guide for both scientific research and policy.32
5.5. The semantics of ALIC
The semantics of ALIC bears out that final derivability is a stable notion.33 For each premise set Γ , the set of its
ALIC-models is a subset of its LIC-models: MALIC(Γ ) ⊆ MLIC(Γ ). This subset is obtained by a two-step selection.
For any M ∈ MLIC, two abnormal parts of M are defined as follows:
Definition 12. AbAt(M) = {ω ∈ ΩAt | M | ω} and AbRS(M) = {ω ∈ ΩRS | M | ω}.
Now the selection runs as follows:
M0(Γ ) =df MLIC(Γ ), where MLIC(Γ ) = {M ∈ MLIC | M | Γ }
DabAt(Δ) is a DabAt-consequence of Γ iff Δ ⊆ ΩAt and DabAt(Δ) is verified by all M ∈ M0(Γ ). Where
DabAt(Δ11),DabAt(Δ12), . . . are the minimal DabAt-consequences of Γ , U1(Γ ) =df Δ11 ∪Δ12 ∪ · · ·
M1(Γ ) =df {M ∈ M0(Γ ) | AbAt(M) ⊆ U1(Γ )}
DabRS(Δ) is a DabRS-consequence of Γ iff Δ ⊆ ΩRS and DabRS(Δ) is verified by all M ∈ M1(Γ ). Where
DabRS(Δ21),DabRS(Δ22), . . . are the minimal DabRS-consequences of Γ , U2(Γ ) =df Δ21 ∪Δ22 ∪ · · ·
M2(Γ ) =df {M ∈ M1 | AbRS(M) ⊆ U2(Γ )}
This concludes the selection of the ALIC-models of Γ :
MALIC(Γ ) = M2(Γ )
The meta-theoretical properties of adaptive logics are straightforward and have been studied extensively [2–4].
If the proof theory of the LLL is sound and complete with respect to its semantics, then so is the resulting adaptive
logic’s proof theory regarding to the adaptive semantics. However, the proof theory of LIC is sound, but not complete,
with respect to the LIC-semantics. Hence the ALIC-proof theory is sound, but not complete, with regard to the ALIC-
semantics.
5.6. ALIC and MaxEnt
Inspection of the ALIC semantics gives us a clear view on what it does at the level of probability functions. Recall
that an (A)LIC-model is a triple M = 〈R+, c,p〉, where p is a probability distribution over V. Intuitively, the set of
ALIC-models of Γ consists of those LIC-models of Γ that verify no more abnormalities (ω ∈ ΩRS ∪ ΩAt) than
required by Γ . Whether M | ω, wholly depends on p. So ALIC indirectly selects those probability functions p that
satisfy the premises, but verify no more abnormalities than required.
The ALIC semantics and the MaxEnt principle discussed in Section 3.2, are somehow similar in that they both
provide a mechanism to select one or more members from a set of probability distributions (a credal set) satisfying
Γ . However, if this credal set is closed and convex, MaxEnt selects one single probability function, whereas the set
of ALIC-models of Γ will usually not be a singleton (and its members may also differ qua p). Moreover, there is no
guarantee that for any M ∈ MALIC(Γ ), p has maximal entropy.34
Given this semantic difference, ALIC and MaxEnt-based causal discovery, such as the framework of Williamson
[24, §§5.6–5.7], will typically lead to different results if the premises consist of a partial list of IRs. ALIC tends to
32 This gives rise to some kind of ‘reverse falsificationism’. As the acceptability of α depends on the falsehood of Υi ’s members, try to prove their
truth (e.g. by gathering new data and performing new conditional independence tests). Accept α in case such proofs fail.
33 For a general characterization of the semantics of adaptive logics, see [4, pp. 229–230]. For the semantics of combined adaptive logics, see [2,
pp. 56–57].
34 Entropy is defined as follows [24, p. 80]: H = −∑v@V p(v) logp(v) where v@V is any conjunction of assignments of values to the members
of V (cf. state descriptions for a system with families of related properties in [5, pp. 58, 70, 76]).
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derive A − B,A − C and ∼ (B − C) on the conditions {(A 	 B | C)}, {(A 	 C | B)} and {∼ (B 	 C)} respectively.
Hence (B → A) ∧ (C → A) is derivable on the union of these conditions. By contrast, in Williamson’s framework
unshielded colliders are less frequent. Regarding our example, it would lead to the conclusion that (B 	C | A), which
rules out (B → A)∧ (C → A). (I leave it to the reader to check both facts.)
Which framework is most suitable is hard to determine a priori. Note that Γ may either be the result of observations
from an underlying DAG in which B → A ← C, in which case ALIC produces the best output, or from an underlying
DAG in which e.g. B → A → C, in which case MaxEnt’s output is the best. Which framework is most suitable is
under-determined by Γ .
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, I claimed that, in scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent and far-
reaching. I also claimed that Pearl’s IC algorithm cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. Finally, I put forward an
adaptive logic, ALIC, which properly solves the problem of ignorance without thereby losing the strong points of IC.
ALIC allows one to derive both classical, probabilistic and causal conclusions from any set of probabilistic and/or
causal premises. Hence it is greatly apt for combining observational knowledge with background knowledge, common
sense knowledge, etc. What is more important: ALIC assigns an adequate truth value to all undecided UIR and CIR
(i.e. to all IR that are undecided even in the light of the available background knowledge, common sense knowledge,
etc). This assignment is based on two rationales: firstly, that scientific models should not be overly complex, and
secondly, that correlation is a useful (but not infallible) indicator of causation. But what is most important, if the
interpretation of an undecided IR turns out to be fallacious (e.g. in the light of new premises), ALIC adapts itself to
the premises and faulty applications of the above rationales are remedied adequately.
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Appendix A. Soundness for LIC
Theorem 7 (Soundness for LIC). If Γ  α, then Γ | α.
Proof. Consider an LIC-proof of α from Γ . Each line of this proof either contains a premise, or an instance of (A1)–
(A6), or a formula which is derived from previous formulas by either (R1) or (R2). I will show that all LIC-models
of Γ verify α, so that Γ | α.
Consider an LIC-model M = 〈R+, c,p〉 such that vM verifies all members of Γ . I will show that for each line i in
the proof, if β is the formula derived on line i, then vM(β) = 1. It follows that vM(α) = 1.
(PREM) If β is a premise, then β ∈ Γ and, by hypothesis, vM(β) = 1.
(R1) If vM(β ′) = vM(β ′ ⊃ β) = 1, then vM(β) = 1 (by (Sv10)).
(A1) By (Sv7)–(Sv12), vM(β) = 1 if β is an instance of (A1)—i.e. an axiom of propositional classical
logic.
(A2) Likewise, vM(β) = 1 if β is an instance of (A2)—i.e. a (semi-)graphoid axiom. I will prove this for
the case of (G5). The proofs for the other (semi-)graphoid axioms are left to the reader.
Suppose that vM((A 	 B | Q ∪ C))= 1 (*) and that vM((A 	 C | Q)) = 1 (**). From (*) it follows by
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p(A = a ∧ B = b ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c)
p(B = b ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c) =
p(A = a ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c)
p(Q = q ∧ C = c)
and from (**) it follows by (Sv3) that for all relevant values of A, B, C and Q,
p(A = a ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c)
p(Q = q ∧ C = c) =
p(A = a ∧ Q = q)
p(Q = q)
From these equations it follows that
p(A = a ∧ B = b ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c)
p(B = b ∧ Q = q ∧ C = c) =
p(A = a ∧ Q = q)
p(Q = q)
But then, by (Sv3), vM((A 	 B ∪ C | Q)) = 1.
(A3, A4, A5) If β is an instance of (A3), (A4) or (A5), then vM(β) = 1. The proofs for these cases are straightfor-
ward and left to the reader.
(A6) If β is an instance of (A6), then vM(β) = 1. For the first part, suppose that vM(A − B) = 1. It has
to be shown that for all Q ⊆ V \ {A,B}, vM((A 	 B | Q)) = 0. So suppose that for some such Q∗,
vM((A	B | Q∗)) = 1. By (Sv3) it follows that for all relevant values of A,B and Q∗,
p(A = a ∧B = b ∧ Q∗ = q∗)
p(B = b ∧ Q∗ = q∗) =
p(A = a ∧ Q∗ = q∗)
p(Q∗ = q∗)
But then, by (Sp9), c(〈A,B〉) = n. Hence, by (Sv5), vM(A−B) = 0, which contradicts our supposi-
tion.
For the second part, suppose that vM(A−B) = 0. It has to be shown that for some Q∗ ⊆ V \ {A,B},
vM((A	B | Q∗)) = 1 (i.e. that Q∗ blocks all paths between A and B—cf. (Sp9) and (Sv3)). Define
Q∗ as follows (cf. [23, Lemma 3.1]):
Q∗ = {X | A = X = B and either X ⇒ A or X ⇒ B}
Suppose that some path P = 〈X1, . . . ,Xn〉 (with n 3, X1 = A, and Xn = B) is not blocked by Q∗.
This means that for this path, Q∗ satisfies none of the conditions (a), (b) and (c) of (Sp9). Hence, by
the definition of Q∗, for all Xi (2 i  n− 1):36
(a∼) if Xi−1 → Xi → Xi+1 or Xi−1 ← Xi ← Xi+1, then ∼ (Xi ⇒ A) and ∼ (Xi ⇒ B)
(b∼) if Xi−1 ← Xi → Xi+1, then ∼ (Xi ⇒ A) and ∼ (Xi ⇒ B)
(c∼) if Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1, then (Xi ⇒ A) or (Xi ⇒ B).
Let us now consider all adjacency relations in P , starting with X1. If X1 ← X2, then X2 ∈ Q∗. But
this contradicts either (a∼) (if X2 ← X3) or (b∼) (if X2 → X3). So X1 → X2 (§).
What about X2 and X3? If X2 ← X3, then X2 ⇒ B (by (§), (c∼) and acyclicity). But then X3 ∈ Q∗,
which contradicts either (a∼) (if X3 ← X4) or (b∼) (if X3 → X4). It follows that X2 → X3 (§§). If
n = 3, X2 ∈ Q∗, which contradicts (a∼), so n 4.
So what about X3 and X4? By the same reasoning, (§) and (§§) together imply that X3 → X4 (§§§),
and hence that n  5. But this implies that X4 → X5 (§§§§) and n  6, etc. So P consists of an
infinite number of nodes, which is impossible.
To conclude, Q∗ blocks all paths between A and B and vM((A	B | Q∗)) = 1.
(R2) If β is derived by means of (R2), and if vM(β ′) = 1 for all the β ′ used for this derivation, then
vM(β) = 1. Suppose that vM(A − C) = vM(C − B) = vM(∼ (A − B)) = 1. It has to be shown that
vM(A → C ∧ B → C) = 1 implies that for some Q, vM((A 	 B | Q)∧ ∼ (A 	 B | Q ∪ {C})) = 1,
and vice versa.
For the first direction, suppose that vM(A → C ∧ B → C) = 1. Given that vM(∼ (A − B)) = 1,
there is some Q∗ such that vM((A 	 B | Q∗)) = 1 (see the soundness proof for (A6)). Now suppose
35 By ‘relevant values’ I mean those values for which the conditional probabilities in question are defined.
36 Note that for all Xi in question, A = Xi = B .
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path between A and B . By (†), 〈A,C,B〉 must satisfy one of the conditions of (Sp9). Trivially,
it cannot satisfy (a) or (b). By condition (c), C /∈ Q∗ ∪ {C}, which is impossible. Hence, contra (†),
vM((A	B | Q∗∪{C})) = 0 and, by (Sv7), vM(∼ (A	B | Q∗∪{C})) = 1. So, by (Sv8), vM((A	B |
Q∗)∧ ∼ (A	B | Q∗ ∪ {C})) = 1.
The proof for the reverse direction is left to the reader. 
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